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Map 2. South Kivu, showing its territoires, collectivités and main towns
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Preface: The Usalama Project
The Rift Valley Institute’s Usalama Project (‘peace’ or ‘security’ in Swahili) 
is a response to on-going violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). The protracted suffering of the inhabitants of this region in 
the past two decades has resulted in the expenditure of billions of dollars on 
conflict resolution. Yet the Congolese armed groups at the heart of the conflict 
are still poorly understood by the international organizations that operate in 
the DRC—and even by the Kinshasa government itself. The Usalama Project 
examines the roots of violence, with the aim of providing a better under-
standing of all armed groups, including the national army, the Forces armées de 
la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo).
The Usalama research programme is guided by a series of questions. What 
is the history of these armed groups? Who supports and controls them? What 
are the relations of particular groups to the state, to neighbouring states, to 
business interests and to the Congolese armed forces? Why have some groups 
been so difficult to demobilize, while others have disappeared? And are there 
patterns to be discerned in the ways that groups proliferate, negotiate with the 
state, and then vanish again?
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach. It analyses historical 
sources and the small amount of quantitative data available, and traces the 
origins of armed groups through interviews with politicians, businessmen, 
representatives of civil society, and members of armed groups. The Project 
involves extended fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. 
The outcomes include reports on specific armed groups and wider geographical 
areas of conflict, and a series of seminars and workshops in the DRC.
Many of the interviews for this report were conducted on condition of 
anonymity. Where confidentiality was requested, identifying information in 
the report is limited to a number with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama 
Project Interviewee #105, Goma, 28 August 2012. In the course of the research, 
accounts of significant and potentially disputed events were confirmed by 
multiple sources with first-hand knowledge of the events under discussion.
8Summary 
The province of South Kivu has been at the heart of the conflict in the 
eastern DRC. It was here that the First Congo War (1996–7) started. 
Since the end of the Second Congo War (1998–2003), the province’s 
potential to cause broader regional destabilization has decreased, but 
violent local conflicts have multiplied, fuelled by political opportunism 
and local struggles over land and power.
It was around the town of Uvira on Lake Tanganyika in September and 
October 1996 that tensions between the Banyamulenge, a Congolese Tutsi 
community, and other ethnic groups escalated, triggering the first clashes 
in a war that would eventually topple the Mobutu regime.1 The rebel-
lion was led by a coalition of local and regional actors, fusing together 
a variety of local, national and regional interests. But this rebellion was 
also a trigger for further armed mobilization, military fragmentation and 
shifting alliances, with a multitude of armed groups making reference to 
a wide array of grievances.
Strikingly, since the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement 
in December 2002, which led to the official end of the Congo Wars, the 
number of armed groups has only increased. Some of the reasons for 
this are directly related to shortcomings in the peace-building effort, 
such as unresolved local conflicts, failed military integration, new and 
continuing power struggles, and the limited success of demobilization 
campaigns. But to understand fully why South Kivu appears to be such a 
fertile ground for the proliferation of armed groups, a longer perspective 
is needed.
This report outlines the historical dynamics behind the armed 
movements in South Kivu, focusing on the period before and leading 
up to the First Congo War. It concentrates on sources of local conflict 
1 Jason Stearns et al., Banyamulenge: Insurgency and Exclusion in the Mountains of South Kivu 
(London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), pp. 14–20.
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but argues that these can only be understood when also concentrating 
on wider political, social, economic, and demographic processes at both 
national and regional levels. While armed rebellion in South Kivu has 
shifted over time, and while each militia has its own history, this report 
traces the broader context of South Kivu’s militarization.
The report highlights three crucial elements of South Kivu’s history, 
all of which sharpened ethnic and political divisions. First, when the 
Belgian colonial administration integrated customary chiefs into the 
new administration and put ethnicity at the centre of politics, it realized 
a territorialization of identity. Since then, identity has been a guiding 
principle of social, political, and administrative organization to the detri-
ment of migrant communities, who have lobbied unsuccessfully to obtain 
their own customary political representatives. Second, the upheaval of 
the 1960s hardened ethnic boundaries and became a key point of refer-
ence for future political mobilization. In particular, the Simba rebellion 
of 1964–7, which drew on political opposition towards Kinshasa and 
customary authorities in Fizi and Uvira, had a disastrous impact on the 
coexistence of ethnic groups in the province. Third, the democratization 
process in the DRC, which was announced in April 1990 and provoked 
intense political competition, hardened ethnic divisions, as local political 
elites appealed to identity as their main mobilizing tactic.
This climate of ethnic rivalry and unresolved communal tensions 
proved to be a fertile ground for violent mobilization. In regions such as 
Kalehe, democratization and the impact of the Masisi War in 1993 had 
already led to the proliferation of armed groups. In Fizi and Uvira, armed 
mobilization increasingly targeted the Banyamulenge and became the 
precursor to outright war.
The many levels of this conflict need to be reflected in a multi-dimen-
sional response. Each armed group has its own characteristics and each 
needs a specific approach. But such an approach to local realities can 
only be effective as part of a comprehensive political process that takes 
into account existing grievances. And, finally, the success of any policy 
in the Kivus depends on the creation of accountable state institutions 
at local and national level that are able to carry out this reform process.
10
1. Introduction 
On 24 March 2013, William Amuri Yakutumba arrived in a Congolese army 
camp with his 60-member bodyguard, declaring that he was ready to join 
the army and serve the nation. The move followed a public statement 
three months earlier that he was ready to integrate into the FARDC—
although many were sceptical about his real motives. Yakutumba has 
been leading one of the most influential armed groups in South Kivu, 
operating in the territoire of Fizi at the southern tip of the province. With 
other dissidents of Bembe origin, he had created the group in January 
2007 after refusing to integrate his former rebel soldiers into the Congo-
lese army and to be deployed outside Fizi. The stated motive behind his 
refusal was that redeployment could only happen if the Banyamulenge, a 
neighbouring ethnic community, also disarmed their combatants or sent 
them to army integration.2
Yakutumba was just the latest in a long line of rebel leaders in the 
southern part of South Kivu, where conflict dated back to the colonial 
period and mainly drew on tensions between the Banyamulenge and 
Bembe communities. Bembe leaderships claimed a tradition of resistance 
to any outside influence, let alone occupation, from the arrival of the first 
Arab slave traders during the nineteenth century to the imposition of 
central government rule from Kinshasa in the post-colonial era.
In other parts of South Kivu, such as the territoire of Kalehe, armed 
mobilization did not begin on a large scale until the start of the First 
Congo War in 1996, and was subsequently connected to the dynamics 
of the larger regional conflict. In Fizi, by contrast, armed rebellion has a 
longer history. Here, the Banyamulenge had been living in conflict with 
the Bembe for decades as a result of competing claims over territory and 
2 For a fuller explanation of the various factors behind Yakutumba’s mobilization, 
see Jason Stearns et al., Mai-Mai Yakutumba: Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South Kivu 
(London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013). Also Judith Verweijen, ‘Guest Blog: Profile of  
Mai-Mai Yakutumba’, Congo Siasa, 1 August 2011.
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local power. These tensions erupted into outright violence for the first 
time during the turmoil that followed independence. A revolutionary 
insurgency movement in the western Congo led by Pierre Mulele inspired 
local Bembe and other leaders in Fizi and Uvira territories to mobilize 
disgruntled youth and start their own armed rebellion. Remnants of this 
late-1960s rebellion retreated to Hewa Bora in the Fizi area, carving out 
a quasi-autonomous territory that continued to resist state control until 
the 1980s.
These dynamics of armed rebellion of the post-independence era 
reappeared in the early 1990s, when President Mobutu’s authoritarian 
regime crumbled, the country experimented with democracy, and regional 
dynamics merged with local power struggles. Tensions between Bembe 
and Banyamulenge again escalated into open violence, prefacing a much 
larger conflict. But armed groups also started to proliferate elsewhere: 
the effects of the democratization process and ethnic mobilization in 
Masisi would eventually affect ethnic coexistence in Kalehe territoire, 
with local youth being mobilized into ethnic militias already from 1993 
onwards.
It was after the start of the First Congo War in October 1996, however, 
that militia mobilization reached its first peak. Local leaderships mobilized 
youth into armed groups, in most cases under the banner of ‘Mai-Mai’ 
and as part of an attempt to stop the progress of the Rwandan-backed 
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL, 
Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire).3 
Years of state decline, the shrinking of the formal economy, and the 
collapse of the educational system facilitated the mobilization of youth, 
who saw in armed groups an opportunity for social mobility and prestige.
In many cases, traditional authorities played a pivotal role in the early 
days, and reference was made to a wide diversity of local grievances, 
3 The term ‘Mai-Mai’ (from the Kiswahili maji, ‘water’) has been adopted by many 
community-based self-defence militias that use traditional religious rituals in their 
recruitment and training.
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many of these deeply embedded in local histories. The most notorious 
and successful example of such mobilization was the Mai-Mai group led 
by Padiri Bulenda in the Bunyakiri area, in the North-east of South Kivu. 
At the helm of a broad and disparate alliance of different groups, Padiri 
would succeed in controlling a vast territory during the Second Congo 
War (1998–2002).
A second wave of mobilization would occur after the Rassemble-
ment congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy) 
launched its military campaign against President Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
in August 1998, leading to the Second Congo War. Local armed groups 
sprung up across the eastern DRC to resist the RCD, and local youth 
joined them en masse—partly because of the overt foreign influence in the 
RCD military leadership, but also as a result of massacres committed 
by the RCD in the region. During the Second Congo War, most parts 
of South Kivu witnessed the creation of new militias, which gradually 
evolved into more structured armed movements and popular protection 
forces. They started collaborating with other local and foreign armed 
groups, mobilized considerable support from the Kinshasa government, 
and came to be connected to local and regional political, military, and/
or economic networks. While Padiri’s faction was the most successful 
of these, other Mai-Mai groups gained control over large parts of the 
hinterland elsewhere in the province, including areas around Shabunda, 
Lemera, Fizi, Uvira, Mwenga, and Walungu.
With the end of the war and the start of the political transition in 2003, 
hopes were high that these groups would either integrate or demobilize. 
Many Mai-Mai commanders, however, remained reluctant to give their full 
support to the peace process. Integration into the national army required 
them to deploy elsewhere in the country, cutting commanders off from 
their local economic and social networks. Furthermore, compared to 
the RCD, Mai-Mai groups lacked negotiating power and found it hard to 
claim major positions in the new national army. This fear of marginaliza-
tion was strengthened by local disputes over power, identity, and land.
In Fizi, some Bembe armed groups refused to integrate as long as 
their Banyamulenge counterparts remained operational and in a position 
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to threaten the Bembe community. Other Bembe leaders, such as 
Colonels Ngufu Jumaine and Godefroid Ngomanya, were less hesitant 
and integrated into the new Congolese army—suggesting a less than 
universal fear of the integration process. Elsewhere, militia leaderships 
struck a more ambiguous stance, trying to benefit from the spoils of 
military integration while at the same time maintaining their military 
force. Localized power struggles, unresolved local grievances over land, 
personal ambitions and elite strategies, a failed military integration 
process, and the weak performance of the state all explain why, even 
when militia commanders integrated, new ones replaced them or new 
mobilization took place in areas such as Shabunda, Kalehe, or the Ruzizi 
Plain.
This report provides a historical background to current security 
dynamics in South Kivu by tracing the origins of local conflicts and the 
creation of armed groups. The examples of Fizi, Ruzizi and Kalele show 
the need to analyse the historical links between identity, territory, and 
power, which explain some of today’s dominant local cleavages and griev-
ances. One of the key dynamics behind the proliferation of armed groups 
in South Kivu is the direct connection between identity and territory, and 
between ethnic citizenship and political representation. These dynamics 
are not limited to the local level, but are clearly linked to national policies 
and power struggles.
14
2. Precursors of Conflict 
Even a stranger to South Kivu would immediately be struck by the most 
salient characteristic of armed groups in the province: almost without 
fail, they rely on ethnicity to rally support and recruits. Yet behind this 
observation lies a complex history that links ethnicity to access to power 
and land, and turns it into a guiding principle of social, political, and 
administrative organization. These historical processes explain why 
ethnicity is of the one of the key local drivers of conflict and a powerful 
framework of reference for armed groups. Even if these armed groups 
have gradually become connected to national and regional actors and 
political and socio-economic power struggles, they continue to claim to 
protect their communities, and rarely transcend ethnic or clan divisions.
Ethnicity and migration
Prior to the arrival of the first Belgian administrators at the end of the 
nineteenth century, different forms of political organization existed 
in South Kivu, ranging from centralized and stratified chiefdoms in 
demographically dense areas to loosely organized and decentralized 
tributary societies.
The most centralized pre-colonial political structure was the Shi 
chiefdom, headed by the mwami (king). The economic use of space 
reflected the social and political structure. The core element of the 
mwami’s power was his control over access to productive land, which 
was regulated by a variety of social and political relations based on 
identity. Land-tenure systems served different functions: they integrated 
individual farmers living within a well-defined territory into a network 
of dependent relationships centred around the payment of tribute; they 
territorialized the ethnic community; and they confirmed the power of 
customary chiefs. For a farmer, his ‘dependence on land ties him to his 
village, keeps him firmly subjected to his chiefs, and obliges him to pay … 
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tribute’.4 Social integration—and hence security—was traded for ‘loyalty 
and tribute to the Mwami, who received power in exchange for granting 
non-alienable user rights over the customary domain’.5
While this suggests the existence of a highly centralized Shi chiefdom 
in the pre-colonial era, it was only when Belgian authorities tried to 
impose their own administrative structures—partly through the integra-
tion and reorganization of existing customary power structures—that the 
mwami’s dominance over land was consolidated. Other ethnic commu-
nities in the province, such as the Rega, Tembo, or Bembe, had a less 
hierarchical and much more flexible social organization, and consisted of 
loosely connected clan structures, with limited references to larger ethnic 
belonging and territory. But here, too, identity was the starting point 
of the colonial administration’s attempts to impose its authority, with 
customary chiefdoms mobilized, reformed, or even created to reinforce 
colonial control.
The reorganization of customary power by Belgian administratos 
proved particularly controversial in areas with large migrant populations. 
Long before the creation of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State in 1885, 
several migrant communities had settled in South Kivu. Unlike North 
Kivu, where colonialism and regional political events had a major impact 
on migration flows, in South Kivu the arrival of migrants was mainly 
linked to political dynamics in the Rwandan and Burundi Kingdoms, 
not to colonization.
The first settlement of Ba in the Ruzizi Plain—the border area between 
today’s DRC and Burundi—dates back to the end of the eighteenth 
century, when Prince Ntorogwe, a son of Mwami Ntare of the Burundi 
Kingdom, was in search of grazing lands for his cattle. The prince first 
4 Elinor Sosne, ‘Colonial Peasantization and Contemporary Underdevelopment: A View 
from a Kivu Village’, in Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment 
(New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 189–210.
5 Séverin Mugangu Matabaro, La gestion foncière rurale au Zaïre. Réformes juridiques et 
pratiques foncières locales. Cas du Bushi (Paris/Louvain-la-Neuve: l’Harmattan/Academia 
Bruylant, 1997).
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settled in the Ruzizi Plain before extending his control from Gatumba 
to the northern edge of Uvira. After conflict broke out between Mwami 
Ntare and Ntorogwe’s successor Rudengeza, resulting in the killing of 
the latter, the Barundi living in Ruzizi settled in Luberizi and disassoci-
ated themselves from the Burundi Kingdom.6
The origins of the first immigrants of Rwandan descent in South Kivu 
are significantly less well documented and until today remain the subject 
of intense argument, with conflicting claims about both the timing of 
their first arrival and their exact numbers. Alexis Kagame has traced the 
settling of Rwandan pastoralists in the Ruzizi Plain as far back as the 
end of the seventeenth century.7 Jean Hiernaux, writing in the 1950s, 
documented at least six generations of Tutsi in Itombwe.8 Most written 
sources agree that a significant influx into South Kivu occurred at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Some scholars have linked this influx 
to political turmoil in Rwanda following the death of Mwami Kigeri IV 
Rwabugiri. Others have argued that the migration was triggered by 
Mwami Rwabugiri’s determination to levy additional tribute from rich 
pastoralists, and the resulting search for new pastures. But these migra-
tions also point to a general pattern of mobility throughout the region, 
with people regularly moving from one region to another.9 Tutsi pastoral-
ists initially settled around Kakamba in the Ruzizi Plain but soon moved 
to higher altitude around Lemera, where the climate was more favour-
6 P. Loons, Histoire du territoire d’Uvira (Uvira: Archives de la Sous-Région 
du Sud-Kivu, 1933). 
7 Alexis Kagame, Un abrégé de l’ethno-histoire du Rwanda (Butare, n.p., 1972).
8 Jean Hiernaux, ‘Note sur les Tutsi d’Itombwe. La position anthropologique d’une 
population émigrée’, Bulletin et Mémoires de la Société d’Anthropologie de Paris 7/11 (1965),  
pp. 361–79.
9 See also Jacques Depelchin, ‘From Pre-capitalism to Imperialism: A History of 
Social and Economic Formations in Eastern Zaire (Uvira Zone, c. 1800–1965)’ (Stanford 
University, PhD thesis, 1974); Georges Weiss, Le pays d’Uvira: Etude de géographie régionale 
sur la bordure occidentale du lac Tanganika (Brussels: Académie royale des sciences coloniales, 
1959); Gasinzira Muzuri, L’évolution des conflits ethniques dans l’Itombwe, des origines à nos jours 
(Lubumbashi: Université de Lubumbashi, 1983).
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able to cattle. It is here that they founded Mulenge village, named after 
a neighbouring mountain. The place would become a quasi-capital for 
these new settlers—and gave the wider community the name by which 
they would later become known: Banyamulenge.10
The area, however, was already under the control of existing customary 
authorities, so the newcomers could not establish their own customary 
structures. Access to much-needed grazing lands depended on acceptance 
of the authority of indigenous customary chiefs, for whom the pastoral-
ists represented an attractive source of income. Mwami Mokogabwe of 
the Fuliiru community provided them with grazing land for their cattle in 
exchange for tribute. In 1924, however, Mokogabwe’s exactions became 
harsher, forcing the Tutsi pastoralists to flee.11 By that time, Belgian 
colonists had arrived in the area and gave the Tutsi permission to move 
further up to the highlands of the Itombwe Hauts Plateaux, prompting 
Mokogabwe to raid their cattle.
Settlement in Itombwe also marked a shift from a semi-nomadic to a 
more sedentary life-style. But there, too, Tutsi pastoral ways and their 
different use of land––livestock breeding as opposed to arable farming––
led to clashes with agrarian societies in the area. As cattle represented 
wealth across ethnic lines, the Tutsi pastoralists would gradually gain a 
dominant economic position. In combination with their isolationist life-
style, this complicated coexistence with other communities.
Territorial impact of colonial rule
Colonialism had the effect of territorializing identity––that is clearly 
defining identity in relation to territory––and further hardening ethnicity 
as the main organizing principle of local society. In an attempt to integrate 
and control the local population, the colonial administration attributed 
land to existing or newly engineered ethnic communities and customary 
10 Gaspard Kajiga, ‘Cette immigration séculaire des Rwandais au Congo’, Bulletin du 
Centre d’études des problèmes socio-indigènes 32 (1956), pp. 5–64.
11 Depelchin, ‘From Pre-capitalism to Imperialism’, p. 71–72.
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chiefdoms. Existing rural societies were restructured and hierarchized, 
and customary chiefs mobilized and integrated into the new administra-
tive order. The colonial authority recognized existing ethnically defined 
social structures or engineered new ones as a basis for indirect rule, 
thus confirming ethnic citizenship as the legal source to claim rights 
and recognising an assumed pre-colonial order. Rather than imposing 
a uniform customary structure however, it created ‘a different set of 
customary laws, one for each ethnic group, and [established] a separate 
Native Authority to enforce each set of laws. The result was a power with 
two faces—the difference between them being that while civic power was 
racialized, so-called ‘Native Authority’ came to be ethnicized.12
Particularly in the Ruzizi Plain and the area around Uvira, this colonial 
policy would produce additional cleavages and provoke tension between 
different communities. In 1928, the Collectivité de la Plaine de la Ruzizi was 
created and the customary authority of the Barundi recognized. The 
creation of this chefferie-secteur (chiefdom-sector)—a hybrid entity that 
sought to bring together similar ethnic communities in a structure with 
both traditional and administrative functions—provoked fierce resis-
tance from the Fuliiru, who claimed control over the Plain. Simmering 
tensions between both communities would regularly lead to violence.13
A similar confusion and source of dispute was caused by the creation 
of other, smaller customary structures in the area. In the case of Itombwe, 
Belgian colonial rule was less a deliberate strategy to organize its colony 
territorially than a case of simple trial-and-error. To halt the mobility of 
the local population and territorialize ethnically defined structures, the 
Belgian colonial administration also introduced at the beginning of the 
twentieth century a system of petites chefferies (small chiefdoms). These 
petites chefferies were much smaller than the chefferies-secteur, and newly 
appointed chiefs headed these new territorial units. In the highlands of 
12 Mahmood Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu: Report of the CODESRIA mission to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (Dakar: Codesria, 1997), p. 4.
13 Weiss, Le pays d’Uvira. 
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South Kivu, two Tutsi chiefs (Kayra and Gahutu) were recognized by the 
Belgians yet without being granted a well-defined territory.
Attempts during the 1930s to reorganize the administrative organi-
zation and the merging of these petites chefferies into larger customary 
structures in the Uvira area left the Tutsi pastoralists without their own 
administrative entity. They became subjects of the Chefferie de Bafuliiru, 
the Chefferie de Bavira and the Chefferie des Barundi and further south, they 
found themselves subjects of Bembe chiefs. 
This territorialization of ethnicity would produce one of the key 
drivers of local conflict and intensify tensions between the Banyamu-
lenge and other ethnic communities in the area. The fact that the colonial 
administration did not recognize the former’s territorial claims—and 
thus did not recognize them as ‘Native Authority’—would also become 
a key argument in local leaders’ attempts to treat the Banyamulenge as 
foreigners and exclude them from the political arena.
Also other regions, this territorial reorganization would introduce new 
cleavages. In Kalehe territoire, for example, two chefferies were instituted: 
the chefferie des Bahavu, ruled by Havu chiefs, and the small chefferie de 
Buloho, ruled by Tembo customary chiefs. Most of the Tembo-populated 
territory and the Rongeronge-populated groupement of Kalonge came under 
control of the Havu, with the Tembo and the Rongeronge  communities 
largely depending on Havu customary rule. As early as the 1940s, this led 
to resistance from Tembo who called for customary and administrative 
recognition. Some Tembo leaders went further, demanding that Kalehe’s 
Bunyakiri area should be integrated into North Kivu—leaving all Tembo, 
from both North and South Kivu, united under one administrative entity. 
In 1959, Bunyakiri was officially recognized as a commune rurale (rural 
commune), including parts of the Kalehe chefferie—but the decision, 
which would have reinforced local claims to political autonomy within 
the Tembo community, was never actually implemented.14
14 ‘Analyse du contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, Action pour la Paix et la Concorde/Life 
and Peace Institute, Bukavu, April 2009, pp. 10–14.
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Elsewhere again in South Kivu, customary chiefs resisted colonial 
domination—even if their position was ambiguous, as Belgian policy 
often ended up strengthening their power. During the early years of 
colonialism, Mwami Rutaganda of Kabare and Mwami Ruhongeka of 
Ngweshe tried to obstruct the growing impact of the colonial adminis-
tration. In Kaziba, Luhwindja and Burhinyi, the bami (plural of mwami) 
were even hiding from the colonial powers. In Kabare, a conflict erupted 
in 1902 that would become known locally as the oku lwa Bene Mwa Koke 
(the war against the sons of Mwa Koke). At the root of this conflict lay 
the killing of the newly-arrived Belgian chef de poste, Lieutenant Tondeur. 
Two years of reprisals followed, during which the mwami of Kabare was 
forced into hiding. Eventually, a pact was signed, but in 1910 the colonial 
powers began to face new symptoms of resistance.15
The introduction of a plantation economy and forced labour were also 
sources of contention, causing several clashes between local farmers and 
a new class of white settlers. One example was the Binji-Binji revolt, 
which started in 1931 near Nduba (Ngweshe). The revolt was sparked 
by the punishment by the colonial authorities of Ngwasi Nyangaza, a 
plantation worker who fled the area. When he returned, he was speaking 
the language of Lyangombe, a magician who had lived in the region in the 
sixteenth century and taught a religiously inspired ideology centred on 
equity between people. His spirit, it was locally believed, could possess 
people through initiation and was often consulted.
Once possessed by Lyangombe’s spirit, Ngwasi Nyangaza was called 
‘Binji Binji’. He announced the invasion of a huge swarm of grasshop-
pers and promised the arrival of new herds of cattle, which would be 
distributed among the peasant population. He ordered all farmers to 
leave the plantations and told them about a great vision he had received: 
their land would be returned and all forced labour would be abolished. 
15 Alphonse Njangu Canda, ‘L’effort de guerre 1914–1918: Coup de grâce porté à la 
résistance des Bashi’, in Les réactions africaines à la colonisation en Afrique centrale (Kigali, 
n.p., 1985), pp. 223–230.
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The colonial administration, understanding the threat of large-scale 
rural upheaval, swiftly put an end to the revolt. The chiefs themselves 
guarded an ambivalent position, as the revolt illustrated the fragility of 
their power. The Binji Binji insurrection derived its strength from the 
mobilization of rites, initiations, and the cult of invulnerability, all used 
to reinforce the promise of liberation from foreign occupation.16
16 Alphonse Njangu Canda, ‘La secte Binji-Binji ou la renaissance de la résistance des 
Bashi’, in Lyangombe: mythes et rites (Bukavu, CERUKI, 1976), p. 124.
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3. Post-independence turmoil:  
The militarization of ethnicity
As in other parts of the country, the first years of post-independence in 
the east were characterized by political turmoil and insurgency. Strate-
gically, South Kivu—which at that time was part of the larger Kivu 
province—was of limited interest and had no real impact on the national 
power game. But the military conflict between loyalists of Prime Minister 
Patrice Lumumba, who had been imprisoned by Mobutu, extradited to 
the secessionist province of Katanga and executed in January 1961, and 
Mobutu-led forces in other parts of the country would eventually inspire 
local political aspirations. In South Kivu, this would drastically affect 
relations between different ethnic communities and transform existing 
tensions into overt violence, forming a turning point in local politics and 
becoming a reference for future mobilization.
The Simba rebellion
In the early 1960s, different insurgent movements, inspired by  Lumumba’s 
nationalist ideology, spread throughout the country. In 1963, Pierre 
Mulele, a former minister in the Lumumba government, launched an 
insurgency against the regime in Kwilu region, to the east of Kinshasa. 
Other Lumumbists had installed the Conseil national de libération (CNL, 
National Revolutionary Council) in exile in Brazzaville. These insurgen-
cies, which touted a revolutionary message of radical nationalism and 
anti-imperialism, would soon also reach Fizi and Uvira. But their success 
would be conditioned by local agendas and regional dynamics.
Before the rebellion, Fuliiru leader Musa Marandura had organized 
protests against the traditional Fuliiru authorities and the provincial 
government, in an attempt to modernize the administration. In early 
1964, Gaston Soumialot was sent to Bujumbura by the CNL to open 
a military front in the east. Here, he was put in touch with Congolese 
nationalists such as Fuliiru leaders Louis Bidalira and Musa Marandura, 
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as well as the Bembe leader Jerôme Mutshungu. Soumialot also received 
support from Rwandan Tutsi refugees, who had left their country as a 
consequence of the social revolution of 1959 and had created the Union 
nationale rwandaise (UNAR, Rwandan National Union), as well as Burun-
dian Tutsi who were opposing the rule of their mwami.17
Local recruits, initially mainly from the Fuliiru community, were 
trained and a successful military campaign followed, adopting the name 
Simba (lion) and capturing Uvira and Fizi. The Armée populaire de libération 
(APL, Popular Liberation Army), the Simbas’ armed wing, was welcomed 
locally as a nationalist liberation movement and gained extensive popular 
support from various ethnic communities.18 In a short period of time, 
the movement took control of large parts of South Kivu, Maniema, and 
northern Katanga.
Lack of military capacity was partly compensated by references to 
magical-religious beliefs and practices that helped increase internal 
cohesion, strengthen discipline, and boost combatants’ courage. A key 
element was the dawa (medicine), a potion produced by witchdoctors that 
was applied to the combatant’s skin to confer immunity from bullets, 
strength, protection, and victory. Water was also sprinkled on combat-
ants to purify and protect them, and the population, during combat. 
The water-cry ‘Mai Mulele’, chanted by combatants, was meant to give 
them determination to fight against the much better equipped Congolese 
national army, which was receiving foreign and mercenary support.
The movement also became directly connected to the global anti-
imperialist struggle through the support of Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. In 
1965, Guevara tried to transform the rebellion into a well-structured 
liberation movement but soon left the region disillusioned. While the 
insurgency was successful in its initial stages, it unravelled just as quickly. 
17 Benoit Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo (Brussels: Centre de recherche et d’information 
socio-politiques (CRISP), 1966).
18 For more details on the Simba rebellion, see Stearns et al., Mai-Mai Yakutumba,  
pp. 13–17.
BOX 1. TITLED MINANT POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH KIVU, EARLY 1960S1
MOUVEMENT NATIONAL CONgOLAIS-LUMUMBA (MNC-L, Congolese 
National Movement-Lumumba)
(nationalist and considered a Kusu/Tetela party, as Lumumba himself 
was a Tetela)
REgROUPEMENT CONgOLAIS (RECO, Congolese Grouping)
(largely represented the Shi of Ngweshe)
CENTRE DE REgROUPEMENT AFRICAIN (CEREA, African Rallying Centre)
(radical nationalist; stronghold in Fuliiru community)
CEREA then split into two factions:2
ALLIANCE RURALE PROgRESSISTE–UNION DES WAREgA (Unerga, 
Progressive Rural Alliance–Rega Union)
(defended the interests of Rega but also had support from Shi in Kabare 
territoire)
UNION éCONOMIqUE DES BABEMBE à FIzI (UNEBAFI, Economic Union 
of the Bembe in Fizi)
(Bembe party that allied with the MNC-L)
1   Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo, p. 265.
2   The split was directly related to the local power struggle between a new class of 
radical politicians, such as Musa Marandura, and traditional authorities. Marandura 
specifically targeted the Fuliiru traditional authorities. During the 1960 elections, radical 
nationalists had gained importance, which forced Mwami Simba of the Fuliiru, himself 
installed by the colonial administration, to go into exile in Bujumbura. The provincial 
authorities in February 1961 replaced him with Marandura but, two months later, the 
mwami returned to the region and removed Marandura with the help of moderate CEREA 
politicians such as Jean Miruho; A. Kabemba, Kindu et la rébellion. Essai d’étude des évènements 
politiques (1960–1964) (Bukavu: ISP, 1976). 
 POST-INDEPENDENCE TURMOIL 25
As well as suffering from growing divisions within the movement’s 
central command, a weakly-developed nationalistic and revolutionary 
ideology could never transcend competition within and between commu-
nities. Rather than leading to a ‘second liberation’ of the country, the 
insurgency ended up pitting communities against each other, sharpening 
ethnic divisions. 
Even before the start of the rebellion, ethnic divisions had fragmented 
the political landscape in South Kivu. Five dominant political parties 
relied mainly on specific ethnic communities (see box opposite).
After 1963, while the provincial government was led by the moderate 
faction of CEREA, the MNC-L gradually extended its influence. The 
mwami of Kabare, who was removed from his official position by the 
provincial authorities in 1961, turned to the MNC-L and became one of 
its most prominent local members until the Congo’s Prime Minister 
Moise Tshombe promised him government support. Rega members of 
Unerga also allied themselves to the MNC-L after provincial authorities 
declared that they would attach part of the Warega chefferie in Mwenga to 
the Ngweshe chefferie. And in Uvira, the MNC-L gained prominence when 
radical CEREA militants followed Marandura’s turn to the Lumumbists.19
The Simba rebellion built on this growing local political opposition 
towards both Kinshasa and the customary authorities in Fizi and Uvira—
but would never overcome existing ethnic contradictions.20 Tensions 
between its two core communities, the Bembe and the Fuliiru, as well 
as intra-ethnic differences, had a considerable effect on its internal 
cohesion. The Bembe saw the Fuliiru as guided only by their own local 
agenda, unconcerned with revolutionary ideology; the Fuliiru, on the 
other hand, considered the Bembe arrogant and expansionist. The Shi 
of Ngweshe, who feared that the rebellion was merely a pretext for the 
19 Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation and Conflict in South Kivu: The 
Case of the Banyamulenge’, Review of African Political Economy 29/93–4 (2002), pp. 499–515.
20 Ruddy Doom, ‘Changing Identities, Violent Conflict and the World System’, in Ruddy 
Doom & Jan Gorus (eds.), Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region 
(Brussels: VUB Press, 2000), pp. 15–9).
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Fuliiru to raid their cattle, refused to support the movement and in return 
were targeted by its combatants. Furthermore, the insurgency slowly 
succumbed to indiscipline, as it incresasingly attracted opportunists who 
wanted to settle personal scores or simply loot the population.
In 1966, the Simba were defeated by a coalition of the Armée nationale 
congolaise (ANC, Congolese National Army), mercenaries, and allied 
militants, and fled into the Hauts Plateaux around Fizi and Uvira. Their 
arrival would drag the Banyamulenge directly into the conflict. As 
early as 1965, some Banyamulenge had created an armed group called 
Abagiriye, to protect them against incursions of Simba rebels. Until the 
large-scale arrival of Simbas on the Hauts Plateaux, however, Abagirye 
played a marginal role and was supported by only a small minority of the 
Banyamulenge population.
Citizenship and territorial claims on the Hauts Plateaux 
The arrival of the Simba on the Hauts Plateaux had a twin effect on the 
Banyamulenge community. Its relations with neighbouring ethnic commu-
nities deteriorated drastically, and at the same time the Simba provoked 
its political awakening and set in motion a drive for emancipation.
Unlike its neighbours, the Banyamulenge never felt attracted to the 
revolutionary message of the rebel leadership. The egalitarian discourse 
sounded much less appealing when interpreted as ‘Kngabana inka 
n’ababembe’, i.e. the free distribution of their cattle to the Bembe.21 When 
the Simba were pushed back into the Hauts Plateaux by the national army 
and started raiding cattle and imposing taxes, the rebellion turned into 
an ethno-military campaign against the Banyamulenge.22 In response, the 
latter established a self-defence militia, which was trained and equipped 
by the Congolese army. The ANC created a humanitarian corridor to allow 
the Banyamulenge population to escape to the Ruzizi Plain and Baraka, 
a town further south along Lake Tanganyika, and mobilized the self-
21 Gasinzira, L’évolution des conflits ethniques, p. 96.
22 Jules Gérard-Libois and Benoît Verhaegen, Congo 1966 (Brussels: CRISP, 1966), p. 399.
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defence group to drive back the Simba. This strategy proved successful: 
the Simba were defeated and the Banyamulenge population was able 
to return back to the Hauts Plateaux. However, while the Banyamulenge 
saw no other option than to seek protection from the national army, for 
their Bembe and Fuliiru neighbours this decision was an  unforgivable 
collaboration with the enemy.23
What started as a conflict between a new class of local leaders and 
customary dynasties, and was inspired by radical nationalistic and anti-
imperialistic ideology, in the end further consolidated existing ethnic 
antagonisms. The Simba campaign had pitched entire communities 
against each other and had left deep scars on all sides. It would become 
a point of reference for future political competition, with memories of 
these events exploited to strengthen political claims, particularly in the 
Fizi and Uvira areas. Local ethnic resentment would thus continue to 
dominate the political realm.
For the Banyamulenge, the insurgency amounted to a socio- political 
awakening. Thanks to their alliance with the government, they were 
granted better access to education, social services, the army, and 
employment opportunities—much to the disapproval of neighbouring 
communities. But they also called for their own administrative entity, 
which would allow them to institute their own customary structures 
and reduce their dependency on other ethnic communities. In 1966, 
Banyamulenge asked local political and military authorities to create a 
new politico-administrative zone on the Hauts Plateaux of the Uvira area, 
the Collectivité des Hauts Plateaux d’Itombwe, yet without success.
During the 1970s and 1980s, local political competition centred on 
two key issues: the creation of an autonomous administrative entity in 
Itombwe and the citizenship status of the Banyamulenge. The distri-
bution of identity cards in 1969 was an important moment of dispute. 
The administrator in Itombwe refused to give these identity cards to 
 Banyamulenge, who he considered foreigners. He gained support from 
23 Vlassenroot, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation and Conflict’, p. 504.
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the mwami of the Vira and other administrators, but was countered by 
the provincial governor who referred to the provisions of the nationality 
law that recognized the political rights of migrant communities.
One year later, for the first time in Congolese history, a Munyamulenge, 
Frédéric Muhoza Gisaro, was elected to the Conseil législatif––the national 
parliament. This election gave further impetus to the socio-political 
emancipation of the Banyamulenge community. Gisaro campaigned anew 
for the creation of the collectivité des Hauts Plateaux d’Itombwe, which was 
considered by other communities as a direct threat to their customary 
power. In 1979, a compromise was reached on the creation of a groupement 
in Bijombo, an administrative entity subsumed under a collectivité, which 
originally comprised 18 villages, 12 of them headed by a Munyamulenge 
chief.
Even though Banyamulenge claims to leadership over this groupement 
were supported by the Uvira district commissioner and the provincial 
governor, it was a Vira traditional chief who was eventually appointed. 
From the perspective of the Vira chiefs, the nomination was a customary 
affair and thus their responsibility. Strikingly, in 1971, Mwami Lenghe 
III of the Vira had appointed Obed Sebasonera as sultani (head) of a 
newly created groupement de Bijombo—although the entity would not be 
legally recognized until 1979. The Banyamulenge would regularly reject 
the power of the chief––without success. The Bijombo case was a clear 
illustration of the explosive nature of the political context around Uvira 
and the further territorialization of political claims.
By the time of the elections of 1982 and 1987, a first generation of 
Banyamulenge had completed their university studies, and began actively 
to promote the socio-economic development and political emancipation 
of their community—in turn prompting resentment at their growing 
political influence and challenges to their legal status. Prior to both 
elections, the central committee of the ruling party, President Mobutu’s 
Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR, Popular Movement of the 
Revolution) had rejected the Banyamulenge candidates because of their 
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‘dubious nationality’.24 Although the Banyamulenge were allowed to 
vote, they refused to take part in the ballot. While tensions grew steadily, 
it was only after Mobutu had introduced a democratization process in 
1990 that these tensions would escalate into open violence.
24 Vlassenroot, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation and Conflict’, p. 506.
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4. State collapse and crisis 
In April 1990, after undertaking a consultative tour throughout the country, 
Mobutu announced the end of single-party rule and initiated a process 
of democratization. This set in motion a fierce competition between 
old members of Mobutu’s patronage network and new political elites. 
Mobutu skilfully exploited existing divisions to weaken his opponents. 
One strategy was the introduction in 1993 of géopolitique (geopolitics). 
According to this principle, the composition of national institutions had 
to be based on regional quotas: in contrast to the previous principle of 
rotation, high ranking provincial administrators from then on had to 
originate from the province where they were posted.
The principle of géopolitique soon became an instrument by which 
all those considered as ‘not indigenous’ to their region were politically 
excluded. In Shaba (Katanga), it triggered violent campaigns against the 
Luba from Kasai, and in North Kivu against the Banyarwanda, i.e. those 
who had come from Rwanda. In South Kivu, it was mainly the Banyamu-
lenge who became the focus of popular vitriol. But the prospects of the 
democratization process also created new rifts between political elites 
and re-introduced ethnic politics, leading to increasing tensions between 
different communities.
The promise of ethnic mobilization
In South Kivu, Mobutu’s announcement soon instigated a fierce polit-
ical rivalry between different ethnic elites. Although in the early 1990s, 
a prominent local civil society was active in the province, its leaders’ 
ambitions and ethnic rivalries eventually compromised its mobilizing 
capacity. Mobutu’s recycling of local political elites further prevented 
the formation of a strong counter-force and intensified ethnic tension. 
A prominent role in local civil society was played by the mutuelles, 
which had begun as ethnically-based urban associations, whose aim was 
to offer social assistance to their members and safeguard the community’s 
cultural identity and reproduction. As political competition and ethnic 
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mistrust intensified during the democratization process, local political 
elites turned these groups into vehicles for their political aspirations. 
These mutuelles had to consolidate a popular power base and provide 
them with the necessary resources.
Perhaps the most influential mutuelle was Solidarité Bashi-Bahavu (SBB, 
Shi-Havu Solidarity). After the introduction of the géopolitique, two Rega 
were appointed as provincial governor and provincial director. For the 
ruling Shi elite, these appointments constituted a direct threat to their 
political dominance. Thus, the SBB became an instrument for urban Shi 
political elites and businessmen. Its leadership was closely connected 
to local civil society groups, the Catholic Church, universities, and the 
local branch of the main opposition party, the Union pour la démocratie et 
le progrès social (UDPS, Union for Democracy and Social Progress), led 
by Étienne Tshisekedi. The SBB thus represented a powerful network 
that could mobilize large parts of the Shi community—and in order to 
strengthen its power base, it also tried to bring in other ethnic groups, 
such as the Havu and Vira.
Mistrust, however, was also growing between different sub-groups 
within ethnic communities. This was particularly the case when, in 
1993, Mobutu nominated Faustin Birindwa, a Shi and local UDPS leader, 
as prime minister. Birindwa and other prominent Shi members were 
promptly excluded from the opposition party, leading to its split into 
two factions: UDPS-Radicale (UDPS-Radical) and UDPS-Modéré (UDPS-
Moderate), the latter also known as the Birindwa faction. From then on, 
SBB would rally around Birindwa and other Shi leaders from Ngweshe.
The same ethnic rivalries affected the cohesion of local civil society, 
which, instead of being a guiding platform of the democratization 
movement, ended up mirroring existing social contradictions. At the 
origins of the crisis were diverging perspectives within the provincial civil 
society coordination body, the Bureau de la Société Civile (Office of the Civil 
Society), over which strategy to follow after Birindwa’s appointment as 
prime minister. Shi members of the Bureau from Ngweshe were in favour 
of supporting Birindwa’s faction but others refused to collaborate with 
a figure they saw as Mobutu’s ally. The president of the Bureau, a Shi 
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from Ngweshe, eventually lost his support and was replaced by a Rega 
member. This caused a rift within civil society, with Shi members leaving 
the civil society general assembly and creating alternative, rival civil 
society structures.
Land and citizenship claims
While in Bukavu the democratization process reinforced ethnic divisions 
between local elites, elsewhere in South Kivu it provoked communal 
tensions and violence. Unresolved claims to customary power on the 
part of several ethnic communities and the issue of political representa-
tion again took central stage in mobilization efforts in Kalehe territoire 
and around Uvira. The arrival in 1993 of large numbers of Hutu refugees 
from Burundi and in 1994 from Rwanda additionally complicated these 
conflicts.
Growing ethnic antagonism in Kalehe territoire was the result of ampli-
fied competition over political representation and land issues between 
different ethnic communities, a revival of Tembo territorial claims, and 
spill-over effects of the Masisi War.25 A complex web of ethnic alliances 
and divisions would turn particularly the Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe into a 
highly contested zone.
This area had been largely uninhabited before the colonial period, due 
to its high altitude and cool climate. To support the development of a 
local plantation economy, Belgian colonial administrators had promoted 
the immigration of large numbers of Banyarwanda directly from Rwanda 
or North Kivu to settle in Kalehe. These settlers were joined by Tutsi 
refugees fleeing political turmoil caused by the 1959–62 revolution in 
Rwanda. These Banyarwanda communities did not immediately claim 
customary control over land. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, 
realising the insecurity of their own rights to land access—precisely 
25 For a detailed account of the Masisi War, see Jason Stearns, North Kivu: The Background 
to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012),  
pp. 27–8.
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because the area remained under control of Havu and Tembo customary 
chiefs—the Banyarwanda started to demand their own customary chiefs.
National politics played a part too. After the announcement of the 
democratization process, many Banyarwanda representatives were 
refused permission to participate in the Conférence nationale souveraine 
(CNS, National Sovereign Conference) in Kinshasa, which was charged 
in 1990 with laying out a path towards democratization. The conference 
also confirmed the 1981 citizenship law, which required ethnic communi-
ties to have been established in the Congo before 1885 in order to claim 
citizenship. This robbed the Banyarwanda of the possibility of political 
representation at national level, adding fuel to an already precarious 
situation in both Kivu provinces. Finally, the decision in 1991 to launch a 
registration process to determine the citizenship of migrant communities 
in the Kivus, in advance of local elections, triggered violent incidents in 
Kalehe and around Uvira.
In Kalehe, the first acts of violence erupted in July 1993 and were 
directly linked to the Masisi War that had started a few months earlier 
in North Kivu, setting indigenous communities against Banyarwanda. 
Tembo living in North Kivu’s Walikale and South Kivu’s Kalehe joined 
the Batiri/Katuku militias that were operating in Masisi. When Batiri 
fighters killed a Hutu elder in Ziralo, Kalehe, violence spread to the 
Hauts Plateaux, causing large-scale displacement and the regrouping of 
the population along ethnic lines.26 Things were further complicated with 
the arrival of Rwandan refugees in 1993 and 1994. When some collabora-
tion developed between these refugees and Hutu populations in eastern 
Zaire, Tutsi pastoralists were forced to leave their land and seek refuge in 
Rwanda. The provincial vice-governor and civil society groups initiated 
mediation efforts in 1995, but as the situation also started to degenerate 
in other areas, these efforts had limited impact.
26 ‘Analyse du contexte du territoire de Kalehe’, p. 18–19.
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Build-up to the First Congo War 
In Uvira, tensions triggered by the democratization process were exacer-
bated by the presence of Burundian and Rwandan refugees—creating a 
dangerous mix of local, national, and regional conflict dynamics that 
would gradually turn the area into the venue for increasing violence and 
would constitute the backdrop to the start of the First Congo War.
Unresolved inter-community tensions proved fertile ground for ethnic 
mobilization and an exclusion campaign against the Banyamulenge. 
Célestin Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi, a Mobutist politician of Bembe 
origin and the deputy speaker of the Haut Conseil de la République-Parlement 
de Transition (HCR-PT, High Council of the Republic-Transitional Parlia-
ment), played a key role in linking local tensions between Bembe and 
Banyamulenge to discussions at the national level on the citizenship 
status of the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda. In April 1995, the HCR-PT 
set up a commission to investigate the status of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and refugees in the Kivu provinces. It then adopted a 
resolution calling for the expulsion of all Banyamulenge, referred to as 
recent Rwandan refugees. The same resolution further specified that any 
sale or transfer of Banyamulenge assets had to be cancelled and that the 
latter should be banned from all administrative posts.
On his return to the Uvira and Fizi region in September 1995, Anzuluni 
further stirred up anti-Banyamulenge sentiment. In public speeches, he 
called on the population to help expel the Banyamulenge. He received 
support from local leaders, such as the Uvira district commissioner, 
Shweka Mutabazi, and from Vira Mwami Lenghe.27 Encouraged by 
Anzuluni’s public statements, the district commissioner started imple-
menting the parliamentary resolution and asked the Uvira officer for 
urban planning for a list of all properties and land owned by supposed 
Rwandan or Burundian citizens, including ‘nos frères des Hauts Plateaux’ 
(our brothers from the Hauts Plateaux); to stop all construction works 
27 Mwami Lenghe was a strong supporter of Mobutu. According to local sources, he also 
supported Anzuluni to reduce the influence of Fuliiru in the Vira collectivité.
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by these ‘foreigners’; and to identify and itemize all houses that were 
complete but abandoned.28
By early 1996, harassment of Banyamulenge had become common in 
the Uvira area. Shweka regularly ordered the detainment of Banyamu-
lenge leaders and targeted Banyamulenge development associations. In 
July 1996, tensions would further escalate. During a public meeting in a 
Pentecostal Church in Kasenga, Shweka called for ‘une chasse aux serpents’ 
(snake hunt).29 One month later, Groupe Milima, a prominent Banyamu-
lenge non-governmental development organisation, was banned and 
its leader, Muller Ruhimbika, was accused of political lobbying, arms 
trafficking, and attracting the attention of international observers to the 
citizenship issue.30
On 9 September, representatives of political parties, civil society leaders 
and youth militias organized a demonstration in Uvira and asked for 
the immediate removal of the Catholic Bishop of Banyamulenge origin, 
Jérôme Gapangwa, who was accused of arms trafficking. The march was 
followed by riots and pillaging of Banyamulenge properties. In Bukavu, 
the civil society coordination organized a Marche de la colère (march of 
anger) against the Banyamulenge. Other demonstrations followed in 
Kalehe and Idjwi. Anti-Tutsi associations started distributing pamphlets 
in which the population was invited to act against the emerging threat 
of a Tutsi-land in the region. On 18 September, parliamentarians from 
South Kivu denied the existence of a Banyamulenge community in Zaire 
and called the population to continue its efforts of self-defence against 
‘Tutsi aggressors’.31
28 Mémorandum des Banyamulenge adressé au Vice-Premier Ministre et au Ministre de l’Intérieur à 
Kinshasa, 5 October 1995.
29 Interview with the author, Uvira, July 1998.
30 Muller Ruhimbika Manassé, Les Banyamulenge (Congo-Zaire) entre deux guerres (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2001).
31 ‘Mémorandum au sujet de l’agression de cette région par les éléments armés venus 
du Rwanda et du Burundi’, Groupe Parlementaire du Sud-Kivu, Kinshasa, 18 September 
1996.
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These tensions eventually erupted into overt violence. Banyamulenge 
youth who had been recruited by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
in the early 1990s started returning to the Hauts Plateaux during early 
1996. Initially, they were sent to mobilize other Banyamulenge to join 
the RPF. But as the situation in and around their homelands continued 
to get worse, and benefitting from RPF support, they started organizing 
armed resistance against their Bembe neighbours, targeting and killing a 
number of Bembe leaders.32 In response, Anzuluni, Mwami Lenghe, and 
other local leaders mobilized local youth into armed groups, including the 
Groupe d’action et de soutien d’Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi (GRASABI, Group 
of Action and Support of Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi). In collabor-
ation with the Zairian army, these targeted Banyamulenge villages and 
indiscriminately killed civilians.
According to some Banyamulenge leaders, a delegation was sent from 
Kigali to the Hauts Plateaux in July 1996 to inform the population about 
preparations for a military operation aimed at stopping further attacks 
by the Zairian army on the Banyamulenge community. A few weeks 
after this visit, about 20 Banyamulenge recruits from the Rwandan Patri-
otic Army (RPA) infiltrated from Rwanda onto the Hauts Plateaux to 
prepare for a military intervention, and to inform the population of their 
intentions. At the end of the following month, they were joined by an 
additional 50–100 armed man, also of Banyamulenge origin, but on their 
way to the mountains were discovered by some elements of the Zairian 
Army in the Ruzizi Plains.33
A spiral of tit-for-tat massacres had begun. In early September 1996, 
Zairian army units broke into several churches, arrested local priests and 
missionaries, and looted cars, equipment, and documents. By this time, 
Rwandan units had started to cross into Zaire and raid refugee camps, 
where they clashed with the Zairian army. At the end of September, 300 
Banyamulenge were killed in Baraka by a coalition of Bembe militias 
32 Stearns et al., Mai-Mai Yakutumba, pp. 17–20.
33 Vlassenroot, ‘Citizenship, Identity Formation and Conflict’, p. 509.
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and the Zairian army. On 6 October, Banyamulenge combatants attacked 
the hospital in Lemera, killing patients and nurses. A few days later, the 
Zairian army started looting Uvira.
On 8 October, the provincial vice-governor called for ‘all  Banyamulenge 
to leave Zaire within a week…’ Those remaining, he announced, would 
be considered as rebels and treated as such.34 Although it had already 
become clear that the returning Banyamulenge presaged a larger military 
strategy led by the new Rwandan regime, this speech was the direct 
trigger for Rwanda and its Congolese allies to launch a military campaign, 
which had been in preparation for several months35. On 11 October 1996, 
the Chief of Staff of the Zairian army eventually declared: ‘Zaire is at war 
in South Kivu.’36
34 Amnesty International, ‘Zaire. Lawlessness and insecurity in North and South Kivu’,  
1 November 1996, p. 14.
35 Although the original plan was to launch the campaign from Goma rather than to 
start in Uvira.
36 IRIN, ‘Update on the Conflict in South Kivu, Zaire’, Nairobi, 11 October 1996.
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5. Conclusions and policy considerations
This report has traced the historical roots of political dynamics and 
areas of dispute that have directly or indirectly inspired armed groups’ 
campaigns in South Kivu during and after the Congo Wars. Armed 
mobilization in this province has been the result of many overlapping 
factors including the need for local self-defence, elite-level competition 
and conflict, provincial and national power games and regional dynamics. 
The outcome of these processes today is a hugely diverse political and 
military landscape, with numerous armed groups claiming local authority, 
economic dominance, and/or social control. Their success is related 
not so much to military capacity as to their skills in forging alliances 
with local and national elites and regional networks, and exploiting the 
dividends of the different peace processes and army integration efforts.
A key element in understanding local conflict dynamics is the particu lar 
link between territory and identity, and the territorial/administrative 
organization based on customary chiefdoms. As part of a strategy to 
consolidate its dominance, the colonial administration imposed a new 
administrative structure that confirmed the direct links between identity 
and territory as the basis of local political organization. In contrast to 
Ituri and North Kivu, where colonial policy reinforced local competition 
between different ethnic communities for control over land, in South 
Kivu, it was the way in which the territory was administratively and 
politically organized that triggered local conflict. Some communities 
saw their territorial claims translated into new territorial entities, while 
other communities, such as the Banyamulenge and the Tembo, were 
excluded and felt increasingly marginalized. This confirmed local ethnic 
differences and affected social coexistence. 
The political turmoil that followed the Congo’s independence showed 
the dramatic impact of this territorialization of identity. The Simba 
rebellion—which to some extend expressed the rejection of customary 
leadership by a new class of political leaders—was never able to transcend 
ethnic divisions and only hardened ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, the 
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rebellion’s impact has since been used as a point of reference for future 
armed mobilization. When, at the end of the 1980s, the power structure 
established by President Mobutu started to fall apart and he announced 
a democratization process, local-level political mobilization was skilfully 
manipulated by Mobutu and became characterised by renewed competi-
tion between and within ethnic communities.
By the mid-1990s, local elites shifted the focus of their discourse to 
the presence of migrant communities. In South Kivu, growing tension 
between the Banyamulenge and their neighbours, the further collapse of 
Mobutu’s political regime, and the effects of regional dynamics, created 
the necessary conditions for the outbreak of the First Congo War. This 
war was the first of a sequence of local armed mobilization, of splintering 
of rebel groups, and of new claims to power, protection and profit.37
While the initial trigger to armed mobilization was the start of the First 
Congo War. In 1996, community leaders helped create several Mai-Mai 
groups to resist the arrival of Rwandan forces on Congolese territory. 
Some of their recruits would eventually join the new army led by Laurent 
Kabila, and those left behind would keep a low profile.
The RCD campaign and the start of the Second Congo War in 1998 
also caused a militarization of other parts of the province. The presence 
of the RCD’s Rwandan backers in the DRC was the core motivation 
for many militia leaders to revive their structures or to create new 
armed groups. Close collaboration with foreign forces and elements 
of Mobutu’s former national army provided them with some military 
capacity. Later, the Kabila government would mobilise these groups to 
open a second military front against the RCD in the east. Attempts were 
made to strengthen collaboration between these militias but with limited 
success. Padiri Bulenda, a Tembo who moved his headquarters from his 
home area in Bunyakiri to the area around Shabunda, was considered 
37 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, Conflict and Social Transformation in eastern 
DR Congo (Ghent: Academia Press, 2004).
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by several other groups as the overall Mai-Mai commander and received 
considerable support from Kinshasa.
Things would change again after the start of the transition process in 
2003. Its aim was to create the necessary conditions for successful state-
building and peace consolidation. One of the paradoxes of this process, 
however, is that since its start, the number of armed groups has steadily 
increased. In the Kivu provinces, it set in motion new claims to political, 
military, and economic power, while root causes of violence such as land 
access, citizenship, ethnic coexistence, and resource governance were 
hardly addressed. Moreover, badly designed strategies to deal with armed 
groups added new layers to the conflict. In addition, ‘instead of a political 
transition, the (…) peace-building effort was increasingly constitutive 
of a political regime that reproduces the image of a collapsed state and 
sustains a pattern of structural violence and privatized governance by 
both governmental and non-governmental actors’.38
While armed groups are clearly crucial players in this pattern of ‘priva-
tized governance’, they can no longer be seen as either autonomous or 
strictly local phenomena. Most militias have directly or indirectly been 
connected to community grievances. While the extent to which they are 
embedded in local society differs from case to case, the most powerful 
of these militias have de facto replaced the state authorities, becoming 
the main source of power. As such, they are attractive to local, national, 
and regional businessmen and policy-makers, who in turn link them to 
larger power games. Today, the proliferation of local self-defence groups 
has been replaced with competing networks, in which militias play a 
key role. Even the Raia Mutomboki, a grassroots response to a lack of 
security provision by the Congolese army during and after the transition 
process, has morphed from a popular self-defence force into a local power 
38 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s intractable security conundrum’, 
African Affairs 108/432 (2009), pp. 475–84.
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and protection structure that is closely connected to larger political and 
military networks.39
Policy recommendations need to take all these factors into account. 
The many levels of the conflict must be reflected in a multi-dimen-
sional response. Key points to bear in mind are the following. First, the 
proliferation of armed groups is the outcome of a variable interaction 
between local, national and regional factors and dynamics, with armed 
groups being subject to different transformation processes: so even if 
some similar patterns can be identified in the dynamics behind existing 
militias, each armed group has its own characteristic and each needs a 
specific approach. In some cases, armed groups can thus be causes of 
insecurity, while in others they are its symptoms. Second, addressing 
these local realities can only be effective as part of a comprehensive 
political process, a process that addresses at the same time short-term 
security priorities and the causes of violence. This needs to take into 
account existing grievances and promote reconciliation through admin-
istrative reforms that counter the links between identity, territory and 
political power. Finally, the success of any policy in the Kivus depends 
on overcoming resistance at the centre; it cannot take place without the 
creation of accountable state institutions at local and national level that 
are able to carry out the necessary reform process. A decentralization of 
decision-making, as outlined in the constitution, should be key compo-
nent of this reform process.
39 See Jason Stearns et al., Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth 
of an Armed Franchise (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013).
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Glossary of acronyms, words, and phrases
AFDL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Congo-Zaïre/ Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire
APL Armée populaire de libération / Popular Liberation Army
bami  chieftains; plural of mwami (q.v.)
Banyamulenge people from Mulenge in the territoire of Uvira, South 
Kivu (plural)
brassage  integration of militias into Congolese army; lit., 
‘brewing’ (French)
Bureau de la Société Civile Office of the Civil Society
CEREA Centre de regroupement africain / African Rallying 
Centre
chefferie  chiefdom, the highest level of customary 
administration; at level between groupement and 
territoire (q.v.); secteurs and chefferies are also called 
collectivités
CNS Conférence nationale souveraine / National Sovereign 
Conference
Collectivité administrative entity at level between groupement 
and territoire (q.v.); collectivités can be a secteur or a 
chefferie
Conseil législatif national parliament 
dawa  medicine (Swahili); a protective amulet or potion 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
géopolitique  geopolitics; political principle introduced by 
Mobutu in 1993 according to which high ranking 
provincial administrators had to originate from the 
province where they were posted
Global and Inclusive  peace agreement signed in December 2002 in
Agreement  Pretoria, officially concluding the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (signed in Zambia in 1999) and ending the 
Second Congo War
GRASABI Groupe d’action et de soutien d’Anzuluni Bembe 
Isilonyonyi / Group of Action and Support of 
Anzuluni Bembe Isilonyonyi
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groupement  administrative entity at level between village and 
collectivité (q.v.)
HCR-PT Haut Conseil de la République-Parlement de Transition / 
High Council of the Republic-Transitional 
Parliament
IDPs Internally displaces persons 
Mai-Mai community-based self-defence militias; from maji, 
‘water’ (Kiswahili)
MNC-L Mouvement national congolais-Lumumba / Congolese 
national movement-Lumumba
MPR Mouvement populaire de la révolution / Popular 
Movement of the Revolution
mutuelle ethnically-based urban associations/self-defence 
groups
mwami  king (Kirundi, Kinyarwanda, Nande and Shi 
languages, and several other Bantu languages)
oku lwa Bene Mwa Koke  war against the sons of Mwa Koke (Kibembe)
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie / Congolese 
Rally for Democracy
RECO Regroupement congolais / Congolese Grouping
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SBB Solidarité Bashi-Bahavu / Shi-Havu Solidarity
secteur sector; administrative entity at level between 
groupement and territoire (q.v.); secteurs and chefferies 
are also called collectivités
Simba  lion (Swahili)
sultani  head of a groupement (q.v.)
territoire administrative entity at level between collectivité and 
district
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social / Union for 
Democracy and Social Progress
UNAR Union nationale rwandaise / Rwandan National Union
UNEBAFI Union économique des Babembe à Fizi / Economic Union 
of the Bembe in Fizi
Unerga Alliance rurale progressiste–Union des Warega / 
Progressive Rural Alliance–Rega Union
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